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ABSTRACT
Tools from Fourier analysis of Boolean functions have commonly been used to prove
results both in hardness of approximation in computer science and in the study of
voting schemes in social choice theory. In this thesis we consider various topics in
both these contexts. In hardness of approximation we study the asymptotic approx-
imation curve of MAX-CSP’s for predicates given by linear threshold functions and
prove upperand lowerbounds for this curve formajority-like threshold functions. We
also relate the hardness of MAX-q-CUT to a conjecture in Gaussian isoperimetry and
the plurality is stablest conjecture in social choice. In particular the Frieze-Jerrum
semideﬁnite programming based algorithm forMAX-q-CUT achieves the optimal ap-
proximation factorassuming the unique games conjecture if plurality is indeed stablest.
In social choice theory we show a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
Theorem, showing that for election schemes in elections with more than 2 candidates,
situations in which a voter has an incentive to manipulate by not voting according to
his true preference are common enough that they cannot completely be masked behind
computational hardness. We also prove a generalization of a Gaussian isoperimet-
ric result by Borell and show that it implies that the majority function is optimal in
Condorcet voting in the sense that it maximizes the probability that there is a single
candidate which the society prefers overall other candidates.
Keywords: Hardness of approximation, social choice theory, Gibbard-Satterthwaite, max-q-cut,
Condorcet voting, linear threshold functions.
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1
Introduction
An approximation algorithm is an algorithm that computes approximate solutions to a
given optimization problem. Consider for instance the problem of coloring regions or
countries on a map using a ﬁxed set of colors so that adjacent regions have different
colors. It is well-known that fourcolors sufﬁce if the map is planarand the regions are
contiguous. For more general maps more colors may be needed. Thus, if we decide
thatwe want to colorthe mapusing only three colors, we cannot in general hope to ﬁnd
acoloring. Insteadwemay considerthe optimizationproblemof ﬁnding a coloring that
maximizes the number of adjacent pairs of regions which are differently colored. The
optimal such coloring can be found by trying all possibilities but this is a very inefﬁ-
cient algorithm - requiring time exponentially increasing with the number of regions.
Frieze and Jerrum gave an efﬁcient (polynomial time) approximation algorithm for (a
more general version of) this problem which guarantees to always ﬁnd a coloring in
which the number of adjacent pairs of regions which are differently colored is at least
83.6% of the optimal number. One may ask if this number can be improved upon.
This is the type of question studied in hardness of approximation, where the objective
is to prove upperbounds on the approximation guarantees that can be achieved by any
efﬁcient algorithm fora given optimization problem.
In social choice theory one studies methods for collective decision making. An
example is an election of say a president oramayorfromaﬁxednumberof candidates.
For this example one of the most obvious methods is plurality voting, where every
individual votes on one candidate and then the winner is selected to be the candidate
with the most number of votes. But there are also many other methods in use. For
1
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example electoral voting systems, where (in a simple case) individuals in subregions
select awinning candidate by plurality voting, and then the winner is selected to be the
candidate thatwon the most numberof subregions. Anotheralternative is instant runoff
voting, where each individual presents a preference ordering on the candidates and
then, repeatedly, the candidate which is preferred by the least number of individuals
is eliminated until one candidate is preferred by a majority of the individuals among
the remaining candidates. Although plurality voting seems very reasonable it does
have some possibly undesirable properties. For instance, if all individuals have an
implicit preference ordering of the candidates, there could be situations in which the
runner-up in the election is actually preferred over the winner by a majority of the
voters. Furthermore, there can be situations in which a well-informed individual has
an incentive to vote strategically. For instance, if his top preference is a candidate
which is very unlikely to win, but he prefers the likely runner-up more than the likely
winner, he would have a higher probability of changing the outcome to his advantage
by voting on the likely runner-up. Both of these situations commonly occur when a
third candidate which have no chance of winning “steals” votes from one of the two
top candidates. Arrow andGibbard/Satterthwaite, respectively, showed that both these
situations cannot be avoided by changing the voting method without giving up some
otherdesirable property. On the more positive side it is conjectured that, under certain
requirements, plurality is the most stable voting method under noise, where a small
fraction of the votes are assumed to be incorrectly registered.
These are examples of the topics considered in this thesis. In the next section we
give some more formal background to the theory used in the papers. Then follows an
overview of the included papers, and ﬁnally the three papers themselves.
2
Background
2.1 Boolean functions
Many of the results in this thesis involve Boolean functions. In this section we intro-
duce Boolean functions and some common notation and tools used to deal with them.
A Boolean function of arity n is a function f : {0� 1}n → {0� 1}, mapping a set
of n Boolean values to another Boolean value. 0 is usually thought of as false and 1
as true. In many settings it is more convenient to work with ±1 instead, so for the
remainderof the section a Boolean function is a function f : {−1� 1}n → {−1� 1}.
We will usually think of the input as being uniformly distributed over {−1� 1}n
and denote it by X . By the Fourier-Walsh transform, any real-valued function on
the Boolean hypercube, f : {−1� 1}n → R, can be written uniquely as a multilinear
polynomial in the input variables
f(x) =
�
S⊆[n]
fˆ(S)
�
i∈S
xi. (2.1)
To see this it is enough to note that
��
i∈S xi
�
S⊆[n] is an orthonormal basis for the
vector space of functions f : {−1� 1}n → R equipped with the innerproduct
�f� g� = E[f(X)g(X)].
By (2.1), f can be viewed as a multilinear polynomial over the variables x1� . . . � xn,
3
4 CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
and we deﬁne the degree of f as
deg f = max
S|fˆ(S)�=0
|S|.
Forany coordinate i ∈ [n]we deﬁne its inﬂuence onaBoolean functionf : {−1� 1}n →
{−1� 1} as the probability that changing the value of that coordinate will change the
value of f , i.e.
Infi(f) = P(f(X) �= f(X(i)))�
whereX(i) is obtained fromX by ﬂipping the i:th coordinate. Note that fora dictator
function DICTn�i(x) := xi exactly one coordinate has inﬂuence 1 while the others
have inﬂuence 0. For the majority functionMAJn(x) := sgn(
�n
i=1 xi) ,which is de-
ﬁned foroddn, one can show that each coordinate has inﬂuenceΘ
�
1√
n
�
. Thinking of
the functions as social choice functions, that given n voters’ preferences between two
candidates determines the winning candidate it is natural to ask which function mini-
mizes the most inﬂuential voter. One candidate is the tribes functionTRIBESn which,
rougly, divides the n variables into Θ
�
n
log n
�
groups of size Θ(log n) and returns +1
if and only if all variables in one group is +1. For this function the inﬂuence of ev-
ery variable is Θ
�
log n
n
�
. The KKL theorem [9] showed that this is asymptotically
optimal:
THEOREM 2.1 (KKL). For any f : {−1� 1}n → {−1� 1} there exists an i ∈ [n] such
that
Infi(f) ≥ Ω
�
Var(f)
log n
n
�
.
The deﬁnition of inﬂuences can also be extended to functions taking real values,
f : {−1� 1}n → R, in the following way:
Infi(f) = E[Var[f(X) | X1� . . . � Xi−1� Xi+1� . . . Xn]].
2.1.1 The Invariance Principle
The invariance principle of [13], which can be seen as a generalization of central limit
theorems to multilinear polynomials, is a very useful tool formapping discrete prob-
lems to continuous problems. In its simplest form, it states that if f : {−1� 1}n → R
is of low degree and each coordinate has small inﬂuence on f , then the distribution of
f(X) will not change by much if we replace the Xi’s in the multilinear polynomial
expansion given by (2.1) by i.i.d. standard Gaussians Zi ∼ N(0� 1). The change of
the distribution is measured by an arbitrary C3 functionΨ having bounded third order
derivatives.
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THEOREM 2.2. ( [13], special case of Theorem 3.18)
Suppose X1� . . . � Xn are i.i.d. uniform on {−1� 1}, f : {−1� 1}n → R has deg f ≤ d
and Infi f ≤ τ�∀i. Let Ψ : R → R be a C3 function with |Ψ(r)| ≤ B for |r| = 3.
Then, ������EΨ(f(X))−EΨ
�
�
S⊆[n]
fˆ(S)
�
i∈S
Zi


������ ≤ B10dτ�
where Z1� . . . Zn are i.i.d N(0� 1).
The theorems in [13] and [11] are muchmore general. For example
• The underlying probability space is generalized to an arbitrary ﬁnite product
space (Ω� µ) = (
�n
i=1 Ωi�
�n
i=1 µi) where |Ωi| <∞, ∀i. Functions f : Ω→ R
can still be written as a multilinear polynomial by constructing an orthonormal
basis Xi = (Xi�0 = 1�Xi�1� . . . �Xi�|Ωi|−1) for the space of functions Ωi → R
equipped with the innerproduct �f� g� = EX∼µ[f(Xi)g(Xi)] and expressing f
as
f(x) =
�
σ
fˆ(σ)
n�
i=1
Xi�σi(x)�
where the sum is overall tuples σ = (σ1� . . . � σn) such that 0 ≤ σi < |Ωi|.
• Multidimensional functions f : Ω → Rk can be handled similarly using a test
functionΨ : Rk → R.
In Paper I a few more generalizations that are useful in applications are introduced:
• the C3 restriction onΨ in Theorem 2.2 is removed and replacedwith a Lipschitz
continuity requirement.
• non-orthonormal bases for the functions spaces Ωi → R are handled (this was
also discussed in [11]).
2.2 Social Choice Theory
Social choice theory is the study of methods of collective decision making. An im-
portant example, which is studied in this thesis, are elections where n voters choose
between q candidates. In this case the method of decisionmaking can be described by
a social choice function whichmaps the preferences of all voters to a preference of the
whole society. Depending on the setting, a preference could be eithera single preferred
candidate, a linear ordering of all candidates, or some more general binary relation on
the set of candidates.
Assuming that the candidates are numbered 1� . . . � q, we let [q] denote the set
{1� . . . � q}, Lq denote the set of all q� linear orderings of the set [q] and Gq denote
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the set of all 2(
n
2) tournaments on the set [q], i.e. binary relations such that for every
pair of candidates a� b ∈ [q], either aGq b or bGq a, indicating whether a is preferred
over b orvice versa.
2.2.1 Transitivity
Here we will assume that the voters present linear orderings on the candidates which
the social choice functions maps to a tournament describing the society’s preference
between every pair of candidates. Such a social choice function f : Lnq → Gq is said
to be
• Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), if the society’s preference be-
tween any two candidates only depends on the voters’ relative preferences be-
tween these two candidates.
• unanimous, if forany two candidates a� b ∈ [q], the society prefers a to b when-
everall voters prefera to b.
• transitive, if the society’s preference is always a linearorder, i.e. f(x) ∈ Lq�∀x.
• neutral, if it is invariant under renumberings of the candidates.
• a dictator, if there is a voter i ∈ [n] such that the society’s preference only
depends on that voter’s preference.
One of the ﬁrst results in Social Choice Theory is Condorcet’s paradox which ap-
plies to the function PAIRWISE-MAJn for which the society’s preference between
every two candidates is determined by the majority among the voters’ preferences be-
tween those two candidates. Even for this simple and natural function, there can be
situations in which the society’s preference is cyclic, e.g. the society prefers candi-
date a over b, b over c and c over a. Thus, this particular social choice function is not
transitive.
Arrow’s Theorem states that this situation cannot be avoided unless we sacriﬁce
one of the arguably desirable properties IIA, unanimity ornon-dictatorship.
THEOREM 2.3 (Arrow’s Theorem, [3, 4]). Any social choice function f : Lnq → Gq
which is IIA, unanimous and transitive must be a dictator.
A related, but weaker requirement than transitivity is that of having a Condorcet
winner. We say that a social choice function f : Lnq → Gq
• has a Condorcet winner on input x, if the society’s preference f(x) has one
candidate which is preferred overall the other candidates.
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In paper I we show that the function PAIRWISE-MAJn maximizes the probability
of having a Condorcet winner among social choice functions f : Lnq → Gq that are
IIA, neutral and low-inﬂuential (in that every voter has a small probability of being
able to change the outcome), when all voters’ preferences are assumed to be selected
uniformly at random.
2.2.2 Manipulability
Another desirable property of a social choice function is that of non-manipulability.
Here we consider social choice functions f : Lnq → [q] where the society selects a
single winning candidate. We say that such a function is
• manipulable, if there are situations in which a voter i, who knows the votes
of all other voters, has an incentive to change his vote, in that by doing so the
society’s preference will change to a candidate which voter i originally preferred
more than the candidate that would win if voter i voted according to his true
preference.
An example of a non-manipulable function is a dictator which always selects the top
preference of a speciﬁc voter.
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem shows that manipulability cannot be avoided
when there are at least three candidates, unless the social choice function is a dictator
ornever selects any but two of the candidates:
THEOREM 2.4 (Gibbard-Satterthwaite, [8, 16]). Any social choice function f : Lnq →
[q] which takes on at least three values and is not a dictator is manipulable.
In paper II we show a quantitative version of this theorem.
2.2.3 Noise Stability
Considera simple electionwithn voters choosing between q candidates of which only
one can be selected by the society. The method of decision making can then be de-
scribed by a social choice function f : [q]n → [q].
The noise stability of such functions measures the stability of the output when the
votes are chosen independently and uniformly at random, and then re-randomizedwith
probability 1− ρ. In social choice this can for instance be used to model the situation
where a certain fraction of the votes are incorrectly counted.
DEFINITION 2.5. For ρ ∈ [0� 1], the noise stability of f : [q]n → [q] is
Sρ(f) = P(f(ω) = f(λ))�
8 CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
where ω is uniformly selected from [q]n and each λi is independently selected using
the conditional distribution
µ(λi|ωi) = ρ1{λi=ωi} + (1− ρ)
1
q
.
We say that a social choice function f : [q]n → [q] is balanced if for any j,
P(f(ω) = j) = 1
q
when ω ∈ [q]n is chosen uniformly at random.
It is natural to require that a social choice functionhas low inﬂuence in each coordi-
nate, so that a single voterhas a small chance of changing the outcome of the election.
This avoids dictatorships and other functions that mainly depend on a few voters. An-
other natural requirement is for the function to be as noise stable as possible, so that
even if a small fraction of the votes are miscounted the result is unlikely to change.
It is conjectured that for balanced low-inﬂuential functions f : [q]n → [q], this
noise stability is maximizedby the plurality functionPLURn�q , which selects the most
popular candidate (ties broken arbitrarily):
CONJECTURE 2.6 (Plurality is Stablest).
For any q ≥ 2, ρ ∈ [0� 1] and � > 0 there exists a τ > 0 such that if f : [q]n → [q] is a
balanced function with Infi(1{f(·)=j}) ≤ τ , ∀i ∈ [n]� j ∈ [q], then
Sρ(f) ≤ lim
m→∞
Sρ(PLURm�q) + �.
The special case for q = 2, theMajority is stablest theorem, was proved in [13].
In paper I the invariance principle is used to show that the Plurality is Stablest
conjecture is equivalent to a conjecture onGaussian noise stability.
2.3 Hardness of Approximation
2.3.1 Introduction to computational complexity theory
In computational complexity theory, one is interested in the asymptotics of the amount
of time (or space) required to compute discrete functions. For simplicity we will as-
sume that all combinatorial objects used (numbers, sets, graphs, formal mathematical
proofs etc.) are represented as binary strings, i.e. elements inΣ∗ =
�
n∈�{0� 1}n. The
exact encoding used for different objects does not matter for our purposes (as long as
it is a reasonable one). The length of a string x ∈ Σ∗ is denoted by |x|.
In general a computational problem is deﬁned by a function f : Σ∗ → Σ∗. A
decision problem is a problemwhich can be answered by yes orno. For instance,
• 3-COLOR: given a graph, can the vertices be colored using 3 colors such that no
neighboring vertices have the same color?
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• TRUEΓ: given a proposition T in a formal mathematical theory Γ and an empty
proof consisting of n zeroes 1 , does there exist a formal proof of T of length at
most n?
By identifying a given decision problem with the subset of all strings (usually called
language) forwhich the answer is yes we may deﬁne decision problems as follows:
DEFINITION 2.7. A decision problemL is a subset ofΣ∗.
The complexity class P consists of all decision problems that can be computed in
polynomial time (on any (and thus all) universal Turing machines, which the reader
may think of as a regular computer equipped with unlimited amount of memory). If
an algorithm’s running time is bounded above by a polynomial in the length of the
input (for some ﬁxed universal Turing machine) we say that it is a polynomial time
algorithm.
DEFINITION 2.8. The complexity class P consists of all decision problems L for which
there exists a polynomial time algorithmA such that�
x ∈ L⇒ A(x) = yes
x /∈ L⇒ A(x) = no
The complexity class NP consists of all decision problems forwhich yes-instances
have proofs that can be veriﬁed in polynomial time.
DEFINITION 2.9. The complexity class NP consists of all decision problems L for
which there exists a polynomial q and a polynomial time algorithm (veriﬁer) V such
that �
x ∈ L⇒ ∃Π ∈ Σ∗ : |Π| ≤ q(|x|) and V (Π) = yes
x /∈ L⇒ ∀Π ∈ Σ∗ : V (Π) = no
Note that both 3-COLOR and TRUEΓ are in NP. For instance, for 3-COLOR the
veriﬁer V can be taken to be an algorithm that simply checks that Π is a string that
describes a coloring of all vertices in the graph in a way such that no neighboring
vertices have the same color. Clearly, such aΠ exists if and only if x ∈ 3-COLOR.
Further, P ⊆ NP, since for L ∈ P we can simply ignore the proof Π and use
the algorithm A as veriﬁer. It remains an open problem whether P = NP, although
equality would be very surprising (implying e.g. that proofs of mathematical theorems
can be found in time polynomial in the length of the statement and the length of the
proof).
In hardness of approximation one is interested in showing non-existence of poly-
nomial time algorithms for approximating combinatorial optimization problems (as-
suming P �= NP). Let us ﬁrst deﬁne combinatorial optimizations problems.
1The reason that we include an empty proof of length n in the instance and not just the numbern is that
the numbern is encoded by a string of lengthΘ�log�n)) but we laterwant a polynomial in the length of the
instance to be polynomial in n.
10 CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
DEFINITION 2.10. A combinatorial maximization problem is deﬁned by a function
f : Σ∗ × Σ∗ → R ∪ {−∞} assigning a value f(x� l) to any solution l of an instance
x such that for each x, there are only a ﬁnite number of solutions l (called feasible for
x) for which f(x� l) �= −∞.
An instance x is said to be valid if it has a feasible solution l.
The optimal value for an instance x ∈ Σ is
OPT(x) = max
l
f(x� l).
Aminimization problem is deﬁned similarly by replacing the max by min and −∞ by
+∞.
We can now deﬁne the corresponding complexity classes PO andNPO.
DEFINITION 2.11. The complexity class NPO consists of all combinatorial optimiza-
tion problems f for which there exist
i) a polynomial time algorithm that determines whether an instance x is valid,
ii) a polynomial q such that for any instance x, all feasible solutions l satisfy
|l| ≤ q(|x|), and
iii) a polynomial time algorithm that computes f .
PO is the subset ofNPO for whichOPT(x) is computable by a polynomial time algo-
rithm.
There is a natural pre-ordering of computational problems given by polynomial
time reducibility.
DEFINITION 2.12. Given two computational problems X and Y , we say that X is
polynomial time reducible to Y , denoted X ≤P Y , if there exists a polynomial time
algorithm A which computes the value of instances x ∈ X in polynomial time, given
access to an oracle for Y (i.e. a hypothetical algorithm that computes Y in constant
time).
From this we may deﬁne the complexity classes NP-complete consisting of the
hardest problems in NP and NP-hard consisting of all problems that are at least as
hard as NP. More generally,
DEFINITION 2.13. Let C be a complexity class. Then C−hard consists of all com-
putational problems Y such that X ≤P Y�∀X ∈ C. Further, C−complete =
C−hard ∩ C
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2.3.2 Approximation algorithms
Many NP-hard optimization problems (forwhich no polynomial time algorithm exists
unless P = NP) are possible to approximate within a constant factor in polynomial
time. For instance, for the Euclidean Traveling Salesman Problem where one is given
a set of points in Euclidean space, computing the shortest round-trip route visiting all
points is NP-hard. However, forany � > 0 there exist a polynomial time approximation
algorithm that computes a route no more than 1+� times longerthan the optimal route.
DEFINITION 2.14. If f : Σ∗×Σ∗ → R+∪{−∞} is a maximization problem inNPO,
A is an algorithm and r ∈ [0� 1), we say that A is an r-approximation algorithm for f
if for all valid instances x,
f(x�A(x)) ≥ rOPT(x).
Similarly, if f : Σ∗ × Σ∗ → R+ ∪ {∞} is a minimization problem and r > 1 we say
that A is an r-approximation algorithm for f if for all valid instances x,
f(x�A(x)) ≤ rOPT(x).
Thus, forany � > 0, the EuclideanTraveling SalesmanProblemhas a polynomial time
1+�-approximation algorithm.
Otherproblems can only be efﬁciently approximated up to a certain approximation
constant. For instance, considerMAX-3-SAT deﬁned as
DEFINITION 2.15. An instance of the MAX-3-SATproblem consists ofm clauses, each
being a disjunction (logical or) of at most three literals, where each literal is either a
variable or the negation of a variable from a set of n Boolean variables b1� . . . � bn. A
feasible solution is an assignment l : [n]→ {0� 1} to these variables. The value f(x� l)
of an assignment is the fraction of clauses that are satisﬁed by the assignment.
ForMAX-3-SAT there exist a 78 approximation algorithm based on semideﬁnite pro-
gramming [18]. For the restricted problemMAX-E3-SAT, where we require that each
clause contains exactly three (different) variables, this can be achieved by picking a
random assignment which will satisfy a 78 fraction of the clauses in expectation. Note
that this algorithm can easily be derandomized to get a deterministic polynomial time
algorithm that is guaranteed to ﬁnd an assignment satisfying at least a 78 of the clauses.
This is done in the following way, using the method of conditional expectation: On af-
teranother, set each variable to the value whichmaximizes the conditional expectation
over the remaining variables.
On the other hand it is known [17] that no 78 + � polynomial time approximation
can be achieved (unless P = NP), for any � > 0.
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(b1 ∨ ¬b2 ∨ b4) ∧ (¬b1 ∨ ¬b3 ∨ b2) ∧ (¬b2 ∨ b3 ∨ b5)
Figure 2.1: AMAX-E3-SAT instance. All 3 clauses can be satisﬁed simultaneously so the opti-
mal value is 1.
MAX-3-SAT is an example of class of optimization problems called Constraint
Satisfaction Problems (CSP’s). The maximization version of CSP’s can be deﬁned as
follows:
DEFINITION 2.16. AMAX-CSP Λ = (P� q) is speciﬁed by a set of predicates P over
the ﬁnite domain [q]. The arity ofΛ is the maximal arity of the predicates inP .
An instance I ofΛ consists of a set of variables b1� . . . � bn and a set of constraints, each
formed by a predicate fromP applied to a subset of the variables and their negations.
The optimal value OPT(I) for I is the maximum number of constraints satisﬁed by
any assignment b ∈ [q]n.
Thus, MAX-3-SAT, which can be described as a MAX-CSP (P� q) with q = 2 and
P = {x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3}, is a ternary MAX-CSP overa Boolean domain.
2.3.3 The PCP Theorem and the Unique Games Conjecture
The 78+� inapproximability result forMAX-3-SAT(andsimilarresults forotherMAX-
CSP’s) is obtained by a reduction from a standard problem called the Label Cover
problem forwhich arbitrarily good inapproximability results exist.
DEFINITION 2.17.
An instance of the Label Cover problem, L(V�W�E�M�N� {σv�w}(v�w)∈E), consists
of a bipartite graph (V ∪W�E) with a function σv�w : [M ] → [N ] associated with
every edge (v� w) ∈ E ⊆ V ×W . A labeling l = (lV � lW ), where lV : V → [M ] and
lW :W → [N ], is said to satisfy an edge (v� w) if
σ(v�w)(lW (w)) = lV (v).
The value of a labeling l, VALl(L), is the fraction of edges satisﬁed by l and the
optimal value for L is the maximal fraction of edges satisﬁed by any labeling,
OPT(L) = max
l
VALl(L).
The PCP (Probabilistically Checkable Proofs) theorem [1, 2] asserts that the Label
Cover problem is NP-hard to approximate within any constant � > 0, for suitable
choices ofM andN .
THEOREM 2.18 (Label Cover version of the PCP Theorem). For any � > 0 there
existM and N such that it is NP-hard to distinguish between instances L of the Label
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Cover problem with label set sizesM and N having OPT(L) = 1 from those having
OPT(L) ≤ �.
This implies that any problem in NP (for instance TRUEΓ) has a probabilistically
checkable proof, which can be veriﬁed by looking only at a constant (depending on
�, but not on the length of the instance |x|) number of bits in such a way that a false
proof is accepted with probability � while a correct proof is always accepted. The
proof structure is given by the polynomial time reduction from the NP problem to a
Label Cover problem for which a correct proof (assignment) satisﬁes all edges while
any other (incorrect) proof satisﬁes at most an � fraction of the edges.
However, the PCP theorem is not strong enough to give sharp inapproximability re-
sults forbinaryMAX-CSP’s (2-CSP’s). One promising direction forward is the Unique
Games Conjecture (UGC), a strengthened form of the PCP Theorem introduced by
Khot [10].
DEFINITION 2.19. ALabel CoverproblemL(V�W�E�M�N� {σv�w}(v�w)∈E) is called
unique ifM = N and each σv�w :M →M is a permutation.
CONJECTURE 2.20 (Unique Games Conjecture). For any η� γ > 0 there exists M =
M(η� γ) such that it is NP-hard to distinguish instances L of the Unique Label Cover
problemwith label set sizeM havingOPT(L) ≥ 1−η from those havingOPT(L) ≤
γ.
Itwas recently shown [15] how to obtain optimal approximation algorithms forany
MAX-CSP including 2-CSP’s assuming the Unique Games Conjecture. However, the
optimal approximation constants in [15] are generally not very explicit but given as the
optima of certain optimization algorithms whose running time is doubly exponential in
1/�. where � is the desired precision.
It shouldbe noted that, althoughmany hardness of approximation results have been
based on the Unique Games Conjecture, it is still not known whether this conjecture
holds.
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3
Summary of Papers
3.1 Paper I
Maximally Stable Gaussian Partitions with Discrete Applications.
Marcus Isaksson and ElchananMossel.
Gaussian noise stability measures the stability of partitions of Gaussian space under
noise. In the simplest form we have two jointly standard Gaussian vectors X and Y
in Rn, with a covariance matrix Cov(X�Y ) = E[XY T ] = ρIn, i.e. the coordinate
pairs (Xi� Yi) are i.i.d. N
�
0�
�
1 ρ
ρ 1
��
. The stability of a subsetA of Rn is deﬁned
to be the probability that bothX and Y fall into A. Borell [5] proved that for sets of
ﬁxed Gaussian measure, half-spaces maximize this stability . For simplicity, in this
overview, we restrict attention to balanced partitions, i.e. sets of Gaussianmeasure 12 .
THEOREM 3.1. [5] Fix ρ ∈ [0� 1]. Suppose X�Y ∼ N(0� In) are jointly normal and
Cov(X�Y ) = ρIn. Let A ⊆ Rn withP(X ∈ A) = 12 . Then
P(X ∈ A� Y ∈ A) ≤ P(X ∈ H�Y ∈ H)�
where H = {x ∈ Rn|x1 ≥ 0}.
In paper I, two generalizations of this theorem are considered from which various
applications in social choice and hardness of approximation are derived. The ﬁrst
15
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generalization, also stated in a simpliﬁed formhere, considers the probability of k > 2
correlated vectors falling into A. We prove that half-spaces are optimal even in this
case:
THEOREM 3.2. Fix ρ ∈ [0� 1]. Suppose X1� . . . � Xk ∼ N(0� In) are jointly normal
and Cov(Xi� Xj) = ρIn for i �= j. Let A ⊆ Rn withP(Xi ∈ A) = 12 . Then
P(∀i : Xi ∈ A) ≤ P(∀i : Xi ∈ H)�
where H = {x ∈ Rn|x1 ≥ 0}.
Note that such a distribution on X1� . . . � Xk exists for any ρ ∈ [0� 1] since it can
be constructed by letting Xi =
√
ρZ0 +
√
1− ρZi where Z0� Z1� . . . � Zk are i.i.d.
standard Gaussians.
We prove two applications of this theorem.
• First, in the context of social choice, we show that the functionPAIRWISE-MAJn
deﬁned in Section 2.2.1 maximizes the probability of having a Condorcet win-
ner among social choice functions f : Lnq → Gq that are IIA, neutral and low-
inﬂuential, if all voters’ preferences are selected uniformly at random.
• The second application is in the context of cosmic coin ﬂipping [12, 14] where
k players receive noisy copies of the same n bits and want to agree on a single
uniformly random bit without communicating. We show that each playerapply-
ing the majority function on his received bits maximizes the probability of all
players agreeing among low inﬂuence functions.
The second generalization considers a partition of Rn into q > 2 subsets (instead
of just the two A and AC), and asks for the probability that all k vectors fall into the
same subset. We will still restrict attention to balanced partitions, i.e. into disjoint sets
A1� . . . Aq ⊆ Rn with equal Gaussianmeasure 1q .
It is conjectured that for n ≥ q − 1 and ρ ≥ 0 the most stable partition is a
standard simplex partition, which divides Rn into q partitions depending on which of
q maximally separated unit vectors are closest (ties may be broken arbitrarily):
DEFINITION 3.3. For n+1 ≥ q ≥ 2, A1� . . . � Aq is a standard simplex partition ofRn
if for all i
Ai = {x ∈ Rn|x · ai > x · aj �∀j �= i}�
where a1� . . . aq ∈ Rn are q vectors satisfying ai · aj =
�
1 if i = j
− 1
q−1 if i �= j
The standard simplex partition is also conjectured to be the least stable partition
when ρ < 0.
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When n ≥ q a standard simplex partition can be formed by picking q orthonormal
vectors e1� . . . � eq , subtracting theirmean and scaling appropriately, i.e.
ai =
�
q
q − 1
�
ei − 1
q
q�
i=1
ei
�
and for n = q − 1 it is enough to project these vectors onto the q − 1 -dimensional
space which they span.
When q = 3 the standard simplex partition, also known as the standard Y partition
or the peace sign partition, is described in R2 by three half-lines meeting at an 120
degree angle at the origin (Figure 3.1) and in Rn, where n > 2, it can be exempliﬁed
by taking the Cartesian product of the peace sign partition andRn−2.
Figure 3.1: The peace sign partition
The conjecture, which is still open, can slightly simpliﬁed be stated as:
CONJECTURE 3.4. Fix ρ ∈ [0� 1] and 3 ≤ q ≤ n+1. Suppose X�Y ∼ N(0� In) are
jointly normal and Cov(X�Y ) = ρIn. Let A1� . . . � Aq ⊆ Rn be a balanced partition
ofRn. Then,
P((X�Y ) ∈ A21 ∪ · · · ∪A2q) ≤ P
�
(X�Y ) ∈ S21 ∪ · · · ∪ S2q
�
� (3.1)
where S1� . . . � Sq is a standard simplex partition ofRn. Further, for ρ ∈ [−1� 0], (3.1)
holds in reverse:
P((X�Y ) ∈ A21 ∪ · · · ∪A2q) ≥ P
�
(X�Y ) ∈ S21 ∪ · · · ∪ S2q
�
.
In the paperwe derive two applications of this conjecture:
• First we show that it implies that Plurality is Stablest (Conjecture 2.6).
• We also show that it implies that an approximation algorithm by Frieze and
Jerrum [7] for the optimization problem MAX-q-CUT (described in the next
section) achieves the optimal approximation ratio assuming the unique games
conjecture.
Since it is not known whether this conjecture holds and the standard simplex partition
is optimal, it should be pointed out that one of the main contributions of paper I is to
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show that the optimality of certain discrete problems can be reduced to the question of
ﬁnding optimal partitions with respect to Gaussian noise stability.
The main tool forthe proofs of the applications is the invariance principle described
in Section 2.1.1 and the paperalso includes proofs for the generalizations described in
that section.
3.1.1 MAX-q-CUT
In the MAX-q-CUTproblemorApproximate q-Coloring, one is given a (possible edge
weighted) graph and seeks a coloring of the vertices using q colors that minimizes the
numberof edges between nodes of the same color(i.e. maximizes the numberof edges
between different colors).
DEFINITION 3.5.
An instance of the weighted MAX-q-CUT problem,Mq(V�E�w), consists of a graph
(V�E) with a weight functionw : E → [0� 1] assigning a weight to each edge. A q-cut
l : V → [q] is a partition of the vertices into q parts. The value of a q-cut l is
VALl(Mq) =
�
(u�v)∈E:l(u)�=l(v)
w(u�v).
The optimal value forMq is
OPT(Mq) = max
l
VALl(Mq).
Figure 3.2: In MAX-3-CUT we want to ﬁnd a partition of the vertices into 3 sets so as to
maximize the weight of edges between different sets.
Note thatMAX-q-CUT is a (weighted) binary MAX-CSP over the alphabet [q].
Frieze and Jerrum [7] devised a polynomial time approximation algorithm for
MAX-q-CUTbased on semi-deﬁnite programming, which forany ﬁxed � > 0 achieves
an approximation ratio of αq − �, where
αq = inf
− 1
q−1
≤ρ≤1
q
q − 1
1− qI(ρ)
1− ρ .
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Here, qI(ρ) is the noise stability the standard simplex partition, i.e.
qI(ρ) = P((X�Y ) ∈ S21 ∪ · · · ∪ S2q )�
whereX�Y ∼ N(0� Iq−1) are jointly normal withCov(X�Y ) = ρIq−1 andS1� . . . Sq
is a standard simplex partition of Rq−1. For instance, for q = 3 the approximation
ratio can be made arbitrarily close to
α3 = inf
− 1
2
≤ρ≤1
1− 98π2 (arccos(−ρ)2 − arccos(ρ/2)2)
1− ρ ≈ 0.83601.
We show that Conjecture 3.4 implies that this is the optimal inapproximability
constant forMAX-q-CUT assuming the unique games conjecture (and P �= NP):
THEOREM 3.6. Assume Conjecture 3.4, the UGC and P �= NP. Then, for any � > 0
no polynomial time algorithm exists that approximates MAX-q-CUT within αq + �.
3.2 Paper II
The Geometry of Manipulation - a Quantitative Proof of the Gibbard Satterthwaite
Theorem.
Marcus Isaksson, Guy Kindler and ElchananMossel.
In the second paper we give a quantitative version of Theorem 2.4, the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem. Recall that this theorem stated that any non-dictatorial social
choice function f : Lnq → [q] which takes on at least three values is manipulable. A
consequence of this is that we shouldn’t expect voters to always vote according to their
true preferences in an election with three or more candidates. However, the theorem
only guarantees that there is one set of orderings x ∈ Lnq forwhich some voter has an
incentive to manipulate (such anx is called amanipulationpoint). Hence, this situation
could be very unlikely.
In quantitative social choice some distribution on the voters’ orderings is assumed
and the probability of some undesirable situation is then estimated. In this paper we
assume that the set of orderings X are selected uniformly at random from Lnq and ask
for the probability of X being amanipulation point. Letting
DICT = {f : Lnq → [q] | ∃i : f only depends on the i:th coordinate }
be the set of dictatorial functions, D(f� g) = P(f(X) �= g(X)) be the fraction
of x ∈ Lnq on which two functions f� g : Lnq → [q] differ, and D(f�DICT) =
ming∈DICTD(f� g) the distance from f to the closest dictator, we show the follow-
ing quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem under neutrality (recall
that a function is neutral if it is invariant under renumbering of the candidates):
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THEOREM 3.7. Fix q ≥ 4 and let f : Lnq → [q] be a neutral social choice function
withD(f�DICT) ≥ �. Then,
P(f is manipulable at X) ≥ �
2
104n3q30
�
where X ∈ Lnq is uniformly selected.
Note that although this probability bound is small, it is asymptotically (in q) much
largerthan the bound 1(q�)n that adirect applicationof the original Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem gives.
In the paperwe also prove a strengthened form of Theorem 3.7, which shows that
the same bound holds if we only allow a small (linear in q) set of possible manipu-
lations for a ﬁxed voter and a given proﬁle. This has implications for the approach
of masking manipulability behind computational hardness; an algorithm that tries all
such manipulations (linearly many in q) for a given voter will succeed ﬁnding a ma-
nipulation with non-negligible probability (at least �2/poly(n� q)).
3.3 Paper III
Approximating Linear Threshold Predicates.
Mahdi Cheraghchi, Johan Håstad, Marcus Isaksson and Ola Svensson.
Given a set of integerweights w1� . . . � wn with odd sumW = w1 + . . .+ wn we can
deﬁne a predicate P : {−1� 1}n → {−1� 1} as
P (x) = sgn
�
n�
i=1
wixi
�
where −1 is viewed as false and+1 as true so that the predicate is satisﬁed by x if and
only if P (x) = 1. We call such a predicate a homogenous linear threshold predicate.
Note thatW being odd implies that the sum
�n
i=1 wixi is never zero.
In the third paperwe considerthe hardness of approximating MAX-CSP’s overho-
mogenous linearthresholdpredicates. Forsuchapredicate P the optimizationproblem
MAX-CSP(P ) can be deﬁned as follows:
DEFINITION 3.8. Fix a homogenous linear threshold predicate P : {−1� 1}n →
{−1� 1}. An instance I = (m�N� l� s) of the optimization problemMAX-CSP(P ) con-
sists ofN Booleanvariables x1� . . . � xN , and matrices l ∈ Nm×n and s ∈ {−1� 1}m×n
describingm constraints. The i’th constraint is
P (si�1xli�1 � . . . � si�nxli�n) = 1
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The optimal value OPT(I) of I is the maximal fraction of constraints satisﬁed by any
assignment x ∈ {−1� 1}N .
The simplest such predicate is the majority predicate MAJn = sgn (
�n
i=1 xi),
where n is odd, and for simplicity we will here describe the results for majority, let-
ting MAX-MAJ-n denote the optimization problem MAX-CSP(MAJn). But ﬁrst we
need to deﬁne the optimal approximation curve which is a more reﬁned characterisa-
tion of hardness of approximation than the optimal approximation constant deﬁned in
Deﬁnition 2.14:
DEFINITION 3.9. If f : Σ∗ × Σ∗ → R+ ∪ {−∞} is a maximization problem inNPO,
A is an algorithm and s : R+ → R+, we say that A is an s-approximation algorithm
for f if for all valid instances I,
f(I� A(I)) ≥ s(OPT(I)).
In the third paperwe determine asymptotic upperand lowerbounds on the optimal
approximation curve s∗ : [0� 1]→ [0� 1] achievable by polynomial time algorithms for
MAX-MAJ-n as n → ∞, assuming the unique games conjecture and P �= NP. The
bounds are almost tight in an asymptotic sense.
First note that the trivial algorithm which selects a random assignment will satisfy
a fraction 12 of the constraints on average. Further, this algorithm can be derandomized
using the method of conditional expectation (see Section 2.3.2) to deterministically
ﬁnd an assignment satsfying at least a fraction 12 of the constraints. Hence s
∗(c) ≥ 12
forall c. Ourﬁrst result is that this is optimal for c < 1− 1
n+1 .
THEOREM 3.10. Assume the UGC and P �= NP. Then,
s∗(c) =
1
2
� for c < 1− 1
n+ 1
.
Then we give an algorithm that does slightly better when c > 1− 1
n+1 , i.e. on
instances where all but a small fraction (less than 1
n+1 ) of the clauses can be simulta-
neously satisﬁed. Note that this establishes a critical threshold at c = 1 − 1
n+1 above
which non-trivial approximation is possible.
THEOREM 3.11. For c = 1− δ
n+1 , where δ < 1, we have
s∗(c) ≥ 1
2
+ Ω
�
1√
n
�
where the hidden constant depends on δ.
Although this only gives a small advantage over the random assignment algorithm,
we also show that it is asymptotically optimal when δ is bounded away from 1.
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THEOREM 3.12. Assume the UGC and P �= NP. Then, for c = 1− δ
n+1 , where δ < 1,
we have
s∗(c) ≤ 1
2
+ (1− δ)O
�
1√
n
�
.
In the paper we also generalize these results to other majority-like homogenous
linear threshold predicates. It is well-known that any linear threshold predicate is de-
termined by its so called Chow parameters [6] which are the Fourier coefﬁcients of
size at most 1:
Pˆ (∅)� Pˆ ({1})� . . . � Pˆ ({n}).
For a homogenous linear threshold predicate P (x) = sgn (
�n
i=1 wixi), we have
Pˆ (∅) = 0, and we say that P is Chow-robust if the function does not change when
the weights are replaced by the corresponding Chow parameters, i.e. if for all x ∈
{−1� 1}n:
sgn
�
n�
i=1
wixi
�
= sgn
�
n�
i=1
Pˆ ({i})xi
�
Note thatmajority is Chow robust since all its Fouriercoefﬁcients of size 1 are equal. In
the paperwe derive a sufﬁcient condition forChow robustness and show that ourresults
generalize to Chow robust predicates satisfying some additional technical conditions.
References
[1] Arora and Safra, Probabilistic checking of proofs; A new characterization of NP (draft),
FOCS: IEEE Symposium on Foundations of ComputerScience (FOCS), 1992.
[2] S. Arora, C. Lund, R. Motwani, M. Sudan, and M. Szegedy, Proof veriﬁcation and in-
tractability of approximation problems, Proc. 33rd IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Com-
puterScience, 1992.
[3] K. Arrow, A difﬁculty in the theory of social welfare, J. of Political Economy 58 (1950),
328–346.
[4] , Social choice and individual values, JohnWiley and Sons, 1963.
[5] C. Borell, Geometric bounds on the ornstein-uhlenbeck velocity process, Probability The-
ory and Related Fields 70 (1985), no. 1, 1–13.
[6] C. K. Chow, On the characterization of threshold functions, Proceedings of the 2ndAnnual
Symposium on Switching Circuit Theory and Logical Design, 1961, pp. 34–38.
[7] A. Frieze andM. Jerrum, Improved approximation algorithms for MAX-k-CUT and MAX-
BISECTION, IntegerProgramming andCombinatorial Optimization (Egon Balas and Jens
Clausen, eds.), vol. 920, Springer, 1995, pp. 1–13.
[8] A. Gibbard, Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result, Econometrica 41 (1973),
no. 4, 587ñ–601.
[9] J. Kahn, G. Kalai, andN. Linial, The inﬂuence of variables on boolean functions, Proceed-
ings of the 29th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 1988, pp. 68–
80.
[10] S. Khot, On the power of unique 2-prover 1-round games, STOC ’02: Proceedings of the
thirty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (New York, NY, USA),
ACM, 2002, pp. 767–775.
[11] E. Mossel, Gaussian bounds for noise correlation of functions, Submitted, 2008.
[12] E. Mossel and R. O’Donnell, Coin ﬂipping from a cosmic source: On error correction
of truly random bits, Random Structures Algorithms 26 (2005), no. 4, 418–436. MR
MR2139875
[13] E. Mossel, R. O’Donnell, and K. Oleszkiewicz, Noise stability of functions with low inﬂu-
ences: invariance and optimality, To appear in Ann. Math., 2008.
[14] E.Mossel, R. O’Donnell, O. Regev, J. E. Steif, andB. Sudakov,Non-interactive correlation
distillation, inhomogeneous Markov chains, and the reverse Bonami-Beckner inequality,
Israel J. Math. 154 (2006), 299–336. MRMR2254545
23
24 REFERENCES
[15] Prasad Raghavendra, Optimal algorithms and inapproximability results for every CSP?,
Proceedings of the 40th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, ACM, 2008,
pp. 245–254.
[16] M. A. Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Existence and Corre-
spondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions, J. of Economic
Theory 10 (1975), 187–ñ217.
[17] J. Håstad, Some optimal inapproximability results, Journal of the ACM, 1997, pp. 1–10.
[18] U. Zwick, Computer assisted proof of optimal approximability results, Proc. of 13th
SODA, 2002, pp. 496–505.
PAPER I
Maximally Stable Gaussian Partitions with Discrete
Applications
Marcus Isaksson and ElchananMossel
(Submitted)

PAPER II
The Geometry of Manipulation - a Quantitative Proof of the
Gibbard Satterthwaite Theorem
Marcus Isaksson, Guy Kindlerand ElchananMossel
(Submitted)

PAPER III
Approximating LinearThreshold Predicates
Mahdi Cheraghchi, JohanHåstad, Marcus Isaksson andOla Svensson
(Submitted)

